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ItemThe omniscient threat witchcraft as Africa's Dark Continent Within: an intellectual exploration of the metaphysical, the mystical, and the unseen forces that shape African reality(Suigeneris Publishers, 2026)Witchcraft defies easy definition because it operates at the intersection of several domains that Western thought insists on separating: religion, science, psychology, and politics. In the African context, witchcraft may be understood as a system of metaphysical causation, a technology of power, a moral language, and a never-present threat. As a system of metaphysical causation, it is a framework for understanding how unseen forces produce visible effects. As a technology of power, it is a means by which individuals and groups may influence events, people, and outcomes beyond ordinary human capacity. As a moral language, it supplies a vocabulary for explaining misfortune, success, jealousy, and conflict. The phrase 'omniscient threat' captures something essential about witchcraft in the African context. It is not merely a danger to be avoided by staying in well-lit places or locking doors; it is a threat that knows everything about the individual —vulnerabilities, desires, and fears. It is surveillance without cameras, judgment without courts, punishment without evidence. This is why witchcraft induces such profound anxiety. One cannot hide from it, cannot negotiate with it, and cannot prove its existence — until it acts.
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ItemThe jurisprudence of judicial conscience(Suigeneris Publishers, 2026)Constitutional democracies are built on a promise that is easy to state and difficult to keep: that the person who judges a dispute between the citizen and the state, or between one organ of government and another, will decide according to law and nothing else. Every modern constitution makes some version of this promise. Uganda's Constitution makes it directly, vesting judicial power in courts established under the Constitution and declaring that power to be exercised in the name of the people and in conformity with the law and with the values, norms, and aspirations of the people.2 The promise is tested not in the ordinary run of cases, where law, evidence, and institutional expectation point in the same direction, but in the small number of cases where they diverge — where deciding according to law will disappoint an executive, unsettle a ruling coalition, embarrass a senior colleague, or invite personal cost to the judge who signs the order. It is in these cases, rare but decisive, that a constitutional order discovers whether its promise of independent adjudication was real or merely textual. This book is about that narrow, high-stakes territory. It asks a question that constitutional scholarship has approached from many angles —judicial independence, judicial ethics, judicial courage — but has rarely posed in its sharpest form: does a judge, at some identifiable constitutional threshold, not merely have permission to refuse an unlawful command, but a constitutional duty to do so? The distinction between permission and duty is not academic hair-splitting. A permission is discretionary; a judge who declines to exercise it has not failed in any obligation. A duty is binding; a judge who fails to discharge it has fallen short of the office itself. If judicial conscience is merely a permission, then a judge who complies with unconstitutional pressure has made a regrettable but lawful choice. If judicial conscience is a duty, then such compliance is itself a constitutional wrong—not necessarily one that attracts formal sanction, but one that the constitutional order is entitled to condemn as a betrayal of the judicial office.3 This book takes the second position and defends it doctrinally, not merely rhetorically
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ItemConstitutional epidemiology health constitutionalism, and the jurisprudence of prevention(Suigeneris Publishers, 2026)Africa's escalating burden of non-communicable diseases — cardiovascular disease, diabetes, cancer, chronic respiratory illness, obesity, kidney disease, stroke, and mental illness — is conventionally analysed as a biomedical and behavioural phenomenon. This monograph departs from that orthodoxy. It advances Constitutional Epidemiology as an original jurisprudential theory holding that disease patterns are substantially produced by constitutional design, legal architecture, governance choices, institutional accountability, and the distribution of public power. Constitutions, on this account, are not merely political charters; they are epidemiological instruments, capable of preventing disease or, through silence and structural failure, of producing it. The work develops two companion doctrines. Health Constitutionalism argues that twenty-first-century constitutions must evolve beyond the protection of civil and political liberties to impose positive, enforceable obligations on the state to prevent disease, regulate harmful industries, and create the structural conditions for healthy life. The Jurisprudence of Prevention asks whether courts can and should develop preventive constitutional doctrines — structural injunctions, anticipatory remedies, and regulatory duties — capable of compelling government action before prevent able illness and death occur, rather than merely compensating harm after the fact. Uganda is examined as the principal case study, its constitutional text, National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, health legislation, and institutional practice analysed against the comparative experience of South Africa, Kenya, India, Colombia, Brazil, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and against the interpretive architecture of international and African regional human rights law. The monograph closes by proposing a transformation from reactive to preventive constitutional orders, in which the protection of population health is recognized as a central and justiciable constitutional responsibility
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ItemBirthright, bloodright, and belonging: a comparative constitutional analysis of citizenship in the United States and Uganda —the case for judicial clarification of the status of Banyarwanda born in Uganda(Suigeneris Publishers, 2026)Citizenship has been understood throughout the Western political- philosophical tradition as the fundamental relationship between the individual and the political community. Aristotle conceived of citizenship as participation in the political life of the polis — the capacity to rule and be ruled in turn. For Aristotle, the citizen was defined by participation in deliberative and judicial office; citizenship wasnot merely a status but an activity, a form of practical engagement in collective self- government.4 John Locke, writing within the social-contract tradition, framed citizenship as the product of consent — whether express or tacit — by which individuals enter civil society and thereby acquire both the obligations and the entitlements of membership: the duty to obey the law, and the right to participate, directly or through representation, in the exercise of legislative power.5 Jean-Jacques Rousseau offered a more demanding, participatory vision. In The Social Contract, Rousseau argued that citizenship requires the active engagement of the individual in the formation of the general will: the citizen is not merely a subject of law but a co-author of the laws to which he is subject. This conception of citizenship as active political co-authorship has profoundly shaped modern constitutional democracy's self-understanding, particularly the notion that a constitution is an act by which “the people” constitute themselves as apolitical community.6 Hannah Arendt, writing in the aftermath of the Second World War and out of her own experience of statelessness, provided the most consequential articulation of citizenship's stakes for the twentieth century and beyond. She observed that persons deprived of citizenship are deprived, in substance, of the “right to have rights”— for it is only within an organised political community that legal rights of any kind can be effectively claimed and enforced. Arendt's insight, developed fromthecatastrophic experience of stateless and denationalised persons in interwar Europe, is that citizenship is not one right among many but the precondition for the enjoyment of any right at all. Without it, the individual stands exposed to the arbitrary power of the state, unprotected by the ordinary guarantees of law
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ItemThe sovereign’s mask performed irrationality, coercive bargaining, and the ethics of silence in the theory of sovereign power: a philosophical and jurimetric inquiry into the madman doctrine from Machiavelli to Schelling(Suigeneris Publishers, 2026)The Inverted Premise Classical political theory begins, almost without exception, from the premise that the sovereign’s strength is measured by command of himself before command of others. Aristotle’s account of the statesman, the Stoic ideal of the ruler governed by reason, and the mirror-for-princes literature of the medieval period converge on a single image: the good ruler is the self-possessed ruler. Disorder in the prince’s soul, on this view, precedes and produces disorder in the state. This book is about the doctrine that inverts that premise. It argues—following a line of thought that surfaces explicitly in Niccolò Machiavelli, finds its starkest theoretical statement in Thomas Hobbes, and receives its rigorous modern formulation in Thomas Schelling’s bargaining theory— that under specific structural conditions, the appearance of a ruler’s unreason is not a failure of statecraft but among its most efficient instruments. Call this the madman doctrine: the strategic cultivation of perceived unpredictability as a means of extracting compliance that calm, calculated communication cannot extract at the same price. The madman doctrine is not the claim that irrational rulers sometimes prevail. That claim is trivially true and theoretically uninteresting: chance favours the unpredictable as it favours anyone, some of the time. The doctrine this book examines is narrower and more unsettling — that a rational actor, reasoning correctly about their interests, can conclude that appearing irrational is the optimal strategy, and that audiences are structurally incapable of fully discounting that appearance, because the cost of being wrong about it is asymmetric