| dc.description.abstract | Small pelagic species are considered major economic resource involving several actors to derive livelihoods. The high number of actors increases competition and may result in unequal distribution of benefits depending on the power of influence that actors may exert on each other. The unbalanced power among actors may adversely affect the marketing efficiency. This study investigated the distribution of power among actors and profitability of the marketing channels (market efficiency) of silver cyprinid at Kiyindi Landing Site. The study characterized the actors, assessed the power within and between actors and evaluated the market efficiency. A questionnaire was administered to 224 respondents alongside focus group discussions and key informant interviews to generate data on identity and characteristics of actors, trading patterns, decision making, and negotiations. Further the respondents provided information on types of processed fish, selling prices, costs associated with marketing and distribution of fish as well as the destinations of processed silver cyprinid. Results revealed two categories of actors: primary consisting of fishers, processors, wholesaler traders, transporters, retailers, and secondary composed of commission agent, input suppliers and fisheries officers. The operations are strongly interlinked with processors and wholesalers playing the central role of marketing and distributing fish. Generally, the trade of silver cyprinid was oligopsony; a number of buyers yielded more power than the sellers. Nonetheless, fishers determine the prices of fresh fish though they largely emerge as price takers, hence holding oligopsony trading power. Conversely, the wholesalers and retailer determined the buying prices, hence exercising perfect competitive trading power and emerges price takes. Meanwhile, processors and commissioning agents were able to exert moderate powers to determine prices both purchase and selling price of silver cyprinid, within the domain they are price makers, hence exercising oligopsony power. Commission agents play a unique role as exclusive price makers, exercising full control over commission fees, hence exercising perfect competitive power. Within actors, power imbalances existed between the new and the old players because of rich wealth of knowledge in the industry and the diverse opportunity of capital investment among the old participants. Between actors, power was influenced by capital investments, weather, and fishing season due high perishability of fish. In addition, primary actors, commission agents and input suppliers exhibited bargaining and demonstrative powers while government agencies wielded institutional, constructive and demonstrative influence. Four products: sundried, smoked, salted, powdered and deep fried were produced from silver cyprinid. Sun dried were the most preferred products within and across borders of Uganda. Powdered and deep fried are mostly destined for local supermarkets. DRC and Rwanda had the highest number of actors (eight) while the longest chain within Uganda had six participants. The export markets to DRC and Rwanda accounted for 70% of the total volume of silver cyprinid traded. Ugandan local markets and supermarkets were more efficient yielding high marketing margin and profits because of low marketing costs. Overall fishers and processors have high market share across all distribution channels hence high influence. Whereas, wholesalers strongly regional markets. Agencies with institutional, constructive and demonstrative power should exercise influence to reduce power imbalances among actors to enhance the marketing efficiency of small pelagic fishes. | en_US |
