dc.description.abstract | This study set out to investigate and analyse ministerial co-supervision regime(s) in the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) of Uganda and its decision-making implications. The NSSF was established by the NSSF Act (1985). From 1985-September, 2004, NSSF was under the Ministry responsible for Labour. It was transferred to the Ministry responsible for Finance in September, 2004 up to December, 2021. However, the NSSF Act (1985) was amended in January, 2022, creating a ministerial co-supervision by Labour and Finance Ministries. This study’s research approach was qualitative, with an exploratory design and, an organisational case-study approach. This study purposively selected Fifty Four (54) study participants from NSSF, Labour and Finance Ministries, National Planning Authority, Trade Unions, Federation of Uganda Employers, Uganda Retirement Benefits Regulatory Authority, Uganda Parliamentary Forum on Social Protection, Parliament and, Platform for Labour Action. Structured key informant interviewing and a review of secondary data sources constituted this study’s data collection strategy. It used thematic and content data analysis techniques. This study found out that ministerial co-supervision largely had negative implications for decision-making in the NSSF; albeit, it also had some positive ones. Negatively, it was associated with delays in decision-making; difficulties in reconciling complex interests, coalescing into turf fights; and, in some cases, drawing in Oversight Offices to undertake probes, audits and investigations. These precipitated decision-making delays and deferments of critical decisions. Positively, ministerial co-supervision was pointed out to have improved checks and balances; transparency and accountability, while in some contexts, it had no perceived negative ramifications for decision-making. This study recommends a review of the NSSF (Amendment) Act (2022); enactment of regulations to operationalise the reviewed NSSF law; development of guidelines and a co-supervision policy and, balancing supervisory powers; et cetera. This study also recommends creation of an advisory-supervisory architecture, including giving the Ministry of Finance budget, finance and investment powers. It also recommends joint appointment of the top NSSF Executives to minimise bias and potential abuse of the hiring process. This study also recommends the reversion of NSSF to the MFPED’s singular supervision. | en_US |